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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 





LOUIS A. DENAPLES,      
                                       Appellant 
v. 
 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 09-cv-01802) 
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 16, 2010 
 
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 17, 2010) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Louis A. DeNaples appeals a District Court order dismissing his claim for lack of 






 Because we write for the parties, we recount only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  DeNaples is a member of the Board of Directors of First National Community 
Bank (FNCB), which operates in various locations in northeastern Pennsylvania.  
DeNaples joined the Board in 1972 and has been its Chairman since 1988.  FNCB is a 
federally chartered bank and, as such, is subject to regulation by the Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) pursuant to the National Bank Act of 1864.  See 12 
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 
 In January 2008, the District Attorney for Dauphin County, Pennsylvania brought 
criminal perjury charges against DeNaples, following his testimony before the 
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board regarding a gaming license for Mount Airy Casino.  
Shortly after he was charged, DeNaples took a leave of absence from FNCB.  Thereafter, 
the OCC issued a Notice of Suspension pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(1), which 
formally prohibited DeNaples from being involved with FNCB or any other FDIC-
insured bank. 
 While he and the District Attorney negotiated a resolution to the perjury charges, 
DeNaples maintained that he would not accept a “pretrial diversion,” because such an 
agreement would require him to resign from the Board of FNCB.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1829 
(stating that any person who enters into a “pretrial diversion or similar program” in 
connection with a crime involving dishonesty is prohibited from, inter alia, holding a 
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position as a director of an FDIC insured depository institutions without prior approval 
from the FDIC).  In April 2009, DeNaples and the District Attorney signed a Withdrawal 
Agreement, in which the District Attorney agreed to withdraw the perjury charges in 
exchange for various concessions from DeNaples. 
 Two days after DeNaples executed the Withdrawal Agreement, he received a letter 
from the OCC stating that the agency “ha[d] become aware of [DeNaples‟s] pretrial 
diversion agreement.”  App. 72.  Because the agreement was “based on a crime that 
involves dishonesty or a breach of trust,” DeNaples was “subject to the prohibitions set 
forth in 12 U.S.C. §[] 1829.”  Id.  The letter also informed DeNaples that he “would be 
subject” to “fines not exceeding $1,000,000 . . . [per] day . . .  and/or a term of 
imprisonment of not more than five years” for a knowing violation of § 1829.  Id.  The 
OCC posted its determination on its website as a § 1829 enforcement action.
1
 
 In June 2009, DeNaples‟s counsel wrote a letter to the OCC challenging the 
agency‟s determination that the Withdrawal Agreement constituted a “pretrial diversion 
or similar agreement.”  This letter included an opinion from a Pennsylvania criminal 
defense lawyer stating that the Withdrawal Agreement “was not, in any manner 
whatsoever, . . . [a] pretrial diversion under State Law.”  Id. at 76.  The OCC responded to 
DeNaples‟s challenge with a second letter reaffirming its conclusion that the Withdrawal 
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 Section 1829 is a criminal statute enforceable by the Department of Justice.  The 
OCC is, however, authorized by § 1818 to remove an individual it finds to be in violation 
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Agreement constituted a “pretrial diversion or similar program” under § 1829.  The letter 
concluded that “pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1829 . . . [DeNaples] is permanently prohibited 
from continuing service at the Bank or any other federally insured depository institution.” 
 Id. at 83.  The letter instructed DeNaples to “take immediate steps to inform the Board of 
Directors that he may no longer serve in any capacity as [a director] of the Bank, and 
indicate that his absence is permanent, rather than temporary in nature.”  Id. 
 After receiving the OCC‟s second letter, DeNaples filed a complaint in the District 
Court requesting, inter alia, a declaration that the Withdrawal Agreement did not 
constitute a “pretrial diversion or similar program.”  DeNaples argued that the letters 
issued by the OCC constituted final agency action and, as such, were subject to review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“[F]inal agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial 
review.”).  But see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (stating that APA review is unavailable to the extent 
that “statutes preclude judicial review”). 
More than two months after DeNaples filed his complaint, the OCC commenced a 
separate cease-and-desist proceeding against him pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b).  The 
agency‟s objective in initiating the proceeding was to remove DeNaples from his position 
as Chairman of the Board of FNCB for his violation of § 1829.  One day after 
commencing the § 1818(b) proceeding, the OCC filed a Motion to Dismiss DeNaples‟s 
                                                                                                                                                             
of § 1829.  In this case, because the OCC was not acting pursuant to its authority under § 
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complaint, arguing that any resolution of the merits of DeNaples‟s claim by the District 
Court would impermissibly “affect” the OCC‟s cease-and-desist proceeding in violation 
of the jurisdictional bar in § 1818(i).  See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (“[E]xcept as otherwise 
provided in this section or under section 1831o or 1831p-1 of this title no court shall have 
jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice 
or order under any such section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any 
such notice or order.”).  After oral argument, the District Court granted the OCC‟s 




We exercise plenary review over a District Court order dismissing a claim for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 
(3d Cir. 2000) (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 106 F.3d 
494, 496 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
III 
 DeNaples argues that the OCC was not authorized to issue the letters purporting to 
remove him under § 1829 and that judicial review of the OCC‟s actions does not 
implicate the jurisdictional bar of § 1818(i). 
 The District Court correctly rejected DeNaples‟s argument.  Although DeNaples 
                                                                                                                                                             
1818, its purported enforcement action was not binding. 
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would have us review the enforcement letters in isolation from the OCC‟s pending 
§1818(b) cease-and-desist proceeding, it would be improper to do so.  The OCC‟s 
enforcement letters constituted an agency determination that DeNaples‟s Withdrawal 
Agreement was a “pretrial diversion or similar agreement” under § 1829.  This question is 
under formal consideration by the OCC in its ongoing § 1818(b) proceeding.  The 
congressional framework enacted in § 1818 is intended to allow agencies to conduct 
formal reviews without interference from the federal courts.  See 12 U.S.C. 
§1818(i)(1)(“[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section . . . no court shall have 
jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice 
or order under this section.”).  The broad language of § 1818(i) has led the Supreme Court 
to interpret its jurisdictional bar expansively.  See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. 
v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (holding that § 1818(i) provides “clear and 
convincing evidence” of congressional intent to strip jurisdiction).  Here, the OCC‟s 
§1818(b) proceeding against DeNaples is authorized by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act.  If we were to adjudicate the validity of the OCC‟s enforcement letters, our decision 
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 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 701-706, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 DeNaples argues that judicial review of whether the OCC lacked authority to 
remove him pursuant to § 1829 would not “affect” the agency‟s pending cease-and-desist 
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 DeNaples offers several reasons why the jurisdictional bar of § 1818(i) is 
inapplicable.  First, he claims that § 1818(i)(1) is only intended to protect agency 
proceedings that are not yet final.  Consequently, he insists that § 1818(i)(1) should not 
apply to his purported removal pursuant to § 1829, which he believes constituted final 
agency action.  This argument fails to recognize the OCC‟s consistent position that the 
letters purporting to remove DeNaples pursuant to § 1829 have no binding force.  
Although the District Court concluded that the letters “bear the hallmarks of „final agency 
action,‟” the Court also repeatedly noted that the letters lacked any statutory basis of 
authority.  DeNaples v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, No. 3:CV-09-1802, 2010 WL 
457134, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2010).  DeNaples cannot simultaneously argue both that 
the letters were issued without authority, and therefore are not final, and that judicial 
review of their merits is appropriate under § 1818(i)(1). 
 DeNaples also argues that  § 1818(i) is inapplicable because the OCC did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
proceeding within the meaning of § 1818(i).  It is unclear how this affects our analysis, 
however. Throughout this litigation, the OCC has maintained that the enforcement letters 
were not binding upon DeNaples.  In response to the District Court‟s query whether there 
was any pending agency action that “would preclude Mr. DeNaples . . . from assuming 
his position on the Board of Directors,” the OCC responded: “if he were to assume his 
position, he would not be in violation of the letters, you can‟t violate the letters.  If we 
wanted to remove him, we would have to take some other temporary action or simply 
wait until we resolved it through the 1818(b) proceeding.”  App. 34-35.  Thus, there is no 
agency action prohibiting DeNaples from returning to FNCB, although he may be subject 
to an enforcement action by the Department of Justice should he choose to return.  
DeNaples‟s attempt to have us insulate him from any liability pending the resolution of 
the OCC‟s cease-and-desist proceeding would be tantamount to a determination, contrary 
to § 1818(i), that he is not in violation of § 1829. 
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commence its cease-and-desist proceeding until after he filed a complaint in the District 
Court.  The District Court correctly rejected this argument as well.  The jurisdictional bar 
set forth in § 1818(i)(1) is not limited to judicial determinations that would “affect” 
agency proceedings outstanding at the time that the action is commenced.  Rather, 
§1818(i)(1) imposes an expansive prohibition, stripping federal courts of jurisdiction 
whenever a determination could affect an agency decision.  See Hindes v. Fed. Deposit 
Insur. Corp., 137 F.3d 148, 164 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that § 1818(i), by its own terms, 
“is not restricted to precluding judicial review which would interfere with an ongoing 
administrative proceeding”); see also Groos Nat’l Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 573 
F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The bank and Manges requested an injunction as well as a 
declaratory judgment in their favor [prior to the initiation of the administrative 
proceeding]; section 1818(i) in terms removes the court‟s jurisdiction to issue an 
injunction affecting the regulatory agency‟s notice or order, except as provided in section 
1818 proceedings and review.”).  Consequently, the fact that the OCC‟s cease-and-desist 
proceeding was commenced after DeNaples filed his complaint does not relieve us from 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
4 
 We note that DeNaples will have access to judicial review of the OCC‟s order 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2) after the conclusion of the agency‟s cease-and-desist 
proceeding. 
